Δυστύχημα στο Bufalo NY.

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Πριν από μερικές ημέρες, έπεσε στα χέρια μου το παρακάτω κείμενο (το παραθέτω χωρίς καμία επεξεργασία) γύρω από το εν λόγω ατύχημα.
Φαίνεται ξεκάθαρα πως το ατύχημα ωφείλεται στην κόπωση (fatigue) του πληρώματος. Είναι πραγματικά πολύ λυπηρό το γεγονός πως επαγγελματίες που έχουν τεράστια ευθύνη, τουλάχιστον προς τους επιβάτες τους, δεν πηγαίνουν να πετάξουν ξεκούραστοι... Ας ελπίσουμε οι (εν ζωή) συνάδελφοί τους να μάθουν κάτι από το ατύχημα... Επίσης είναι συγκλονιστικό (αλλά καθόλου απρόσμενο) πως η εταιρία μεταφέρει όλη την ευθύνη στους χειριστές!

"Subject: Colgan air crash hearings - reports from 1st 4 days Colgan Q400 crash hearing today to focus on pilot training, actions Tuesday May 12, 2009
US National Transportation Safety Board hearings commence today on the Feb. 12 Colgan Air Q400 crash outside Buffalo that killed 50 including one person on the ground, and a great deal of attention is expected to be focused on the flight captain's training and competence. Although icing initially was suspected in the accident, a report yesterday in The Wall Street Journal alleged that Capt. Marvin Renslow lacked adequate training to respond to a stall warning and inadvertently sent the aircraft into a fatal dive after the stick-pusher activated. The report, citing sources close to the investigation, also claimed that the pilot had "flunked numerous flight tests during his career." According to NTSB, the hearing will center around testimony on the effect of icing on aircraft performance, sterile cockpit rules, crew experience and stall recovery training ATWOnline, March 26) <http://www.atwonline.com/news/story.html?storyID=16056> . Following media speculation in February that pilot error may have played a role in the accident, Colgan said that its training programs "meet or exceed the regulatory requirements for all major airlines" and that Renslow had 3,379 hr. of flight time, 172 training hr. on the Q400 and was "fully qualified" to operate the turboprop (ATWOnline, Feb. 20) <http://www.atwonline.com/news/story.html?storyID=15662> . In March, NTSB released preliminary findings stating that there was no evidence of pre-impact system failures or "anomalies" and that icing had a "minimal impact on the stall speed of the airplane."

Colgan pilots chatting minutes before crash Wednesday May 13, 2009
The captain and first officer of the Colgan Air Q400 that crashed Feb. 12 near Buffalo were carrying on a "nonessential conversation" for at least 3 min. before the disastrous end of the flight, the National Transportation Safety Board revealed yesterday. Under FAA rules, pilots are to operate a sterile cockpit environment below 10,000 ft., confining any discussion to matters related directly to flight operations. During the conversation, both pilots voiced concerns about flying in icing conditions. NTSB hearings that began yesterday focused on aircraft performance of the Q400, stall recovery procedures and cold weather operations as investigators tried to piece together an explanation of how the Colgan Air turboprop stalled and crashed. Today the board will hear testimony from Colgan VP-Flight Operations Harry Mitchell and VP-Administration Mary Finnigan on company training programs and pilot oversight. Paul Pryor, a flight simulator instructor for the airline, testified yesterday that Capt. Marvin Renslow and his 24-year-old copilot Rebecca Shaw had been trained in stall recovery procedures and were taught how to land in icy conditions. On Monday, The Wall Street Journal reported that Renslow had not been trained in a simulator on how to respond to activation of the stick-pusher stall recovery system. Wally Warner, a representative of Q400 manufacturer Bombardier, estimated that the pilots had about 27 sec. in which to make the proper decisions but said, "The initial reaction to stall warning was incorrect. Altitude can't be the first concern. You have to generate airspeed. You could lose some altitude during recovery." An NTSB timeline of that fateful ay noted the Shaw had flown in on an all-night flight from Seattle prior to reporting for duty. Renslow had commuted to Newark from Tampa on Feb. 9 and began a two-day trip on Feb. 10. There is no indication either crew member had accommodations in Newark. Although pilots are not supposed to use the crew room to overnight, NTSB reported that Renslow had been seen sleeping in the crew room the day of the accident.

NTSB targets fatigue factor in probe of Colgan crash Thursday May 14, 2009
First Officer Rebecca Shaw had been up for nearly 36 hr. prior to taking the right seat of the Colgan Air Q400 that crashed on the night of Feb. 12, the National Transportation Safety Board estimated at a hearing yesterday. Shaw, who commuted to her base in Newark from her home in Seattle, had left home on Feb. 11, transferring in Memphis after a few hours in the middle of the night and arriving in Newark the next morning for a departure that evening. The pilot, Capt. Marvin Renslow, had commuted to Newark from Tampa on Feb. 9 to begin a two-day trip on Feb. 10 (ATWOnline, May 13) <http://www.atwonline.com/news/story.html?storyID=16591> . According to NTSB, neither Shaw nor Renslow had accommodations other than the crew room in Newark. Shaw apparently intended to catch up on some rest in the flight crew room at the airport before reporting for duty later that day, according to testimony provided during the second day of three days of hearings on the crash, which killed 50 people. Colgan, like other US carriers, does not require pilots to live near their assigned bases and allows them to commute--in this case cross-country--to work. "The way they manage their rest time is their own business," VP-Flight Operations Harry Mitchel told board members yesterday. "We hire professionals. They should show up fresh and ready to fly that aircraft." Also, it was revealed that Renslow had admitted to only one of at least three previous failed flight checks when he submitted his employment application. Airlines are required by law to do a criminal background check and obtain driving records for pilot applicants, but they can review only the past five years of a candidate's flight records in accordance with the Pilot Record Improvement Act. "The pilot should have answered those questions on his application honestly," said VP-Administration Mary Finnigan when asked about Renslow's misrepresentation. When asked what would have happened if the company discovered it, she replied, "Termination."

Colgan rebuts overscheduling allegations; Senate plans June hearings Friday May 15, 2009
Colgan Air attempted to push back against allegations that the pilots of the Q400 that crashed Feb. 12 near Buffalo did not get adequate rest prior to the flight because of possible overscheduling, and the US Senate announced it will hold hearings next month to examine "stunning" issues raised by National Transportation Safety Board hearings on the accident. At the hearings this week, it was revealed that First Officer Rebecca Shaw had been up for nearly 36 hr. prior to taking the right seat of the doomed aircraft after commuting all night from her home in Seattle, while Capt. Marvin Renslow had commuted to Newark from Tampa on Feb. 9 to begin a two-day trip on Feb. 10 (ATWOnline, May 14)<http://www.atwonline.com/news/story.html?storyID=16604> . According to NTSB, neither Shaw nor Renslow had accommodations other than the crewroom at EWR. "We want to emphasize that if there was a fatigue issue with [the pilots], it was not due to their work schedule," Colgan said in a statement issued yesterday. "Colgan's flight crew schedule provided rest periods for each of them that were far in excess of FAA requirements." Renslow was off duty for 22 consecutive hours before the flight and Shaw had been off for three days. "The way they manage their rest time is their own business," Colgan VP-Flight Operations Harry Mitchel told board members. "We hire professionals. They should show up fresh and ready to fly that aircraft." Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.), chairman of the Senate aviation operations, safety and security subcommittee, said his panel will hold hearings next month on "gaps in the existing airline safety system." He added, "The disclosures [relating to the Colgan crash] about crew rest, compensation, training and many other issues demonstrate the urgent need for Congress and the FAA to take actions to make certain the same standards exist for both commuter airlines and the major carriers."
 
Στους πιλότους ρίχνει το φταίξιμο again ο NTSB με έκθεση που δημοσίευσε την περασμένη Τρίτη, αναφέροντας χαρακτηριστικά
...When the stick-shaker activated to warn the flight crew of an impending aerodynamic stall, the captain should have responded correctly to the situation by pushing forward on the control column. However, the captain inappropriately pulled aft on the control column and placed the airplane into an accelerated aerodynamic stall...

Επιπλέον
Other factors cited by NTSB were the flight crew's failure to recognize the position of the low-speed cue on flight displays, failure to maintain a sterile cockpit and Colgan's "inadequate procedures" for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions

Θα γίνουν τα απαραίτητα recommendations έτσι ώστε να αποφασίσει ο FΑΑ...
:arrow: http://www.atwonline.com/news/story.html?storyID=19290
 
Ένα πολύ ενδιαφέρον ντοκυμαντέρ σχετικό με το δυστύχημα της Colgan, με αναφορές στις συνθήκες εργασίας και στο διπλό ρόλο της FAA (αφενός επιβλέπουσα αρχή και αφετέρου φορέας για την προώθηση των αερομεταφορών στις ΗΠΑ). Είναι μεγάλης διάρκειας, αλλά αξίζει:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline ... ource=grid
 
Έτοιμες πλέον οι αλλαγές στην αεροπορική νομοθεσία για την ασφάλεια των πτήσεων των commuter, απόρροια του δυστυχήματος της Colgan. Μερικές απ' τις αλλαγές που έρχονται:
Require the FAA to propose new regulations limiting pilots' work schedules to reflect modern research on sleep and fatigue. The NTSB has been urging the FAA for two decades to update the rules. The agency is already working on new rules, but progress has been slow.

Boost the minimum flight experience required to be a first officer from 250 hours to 1,500 hours — the same level as captains. That could force regional airlines to hire more experienced pilots and indirectly lead to higher salaries. Most first officers at major carriers already exceed that threshold.

Require websites that sell airline tickets to state on their first page the name of the carrier operating each segment of the flight. Regional carriers often fly under names that sound similar to their major airline partners.

Περισσότερα:
:arrow: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/sns-ap-us-aviation-safety,0,4421289.story
 
Κατά την ταπεινή μου γνώμη το σημείο που αφορά τίς ελάχιστες απαιτούμενες ώρες γιά να γίνη κάποιος K2 είναι αμφιλεγόμενο.Αν μέ 1500 ώρες μπορής να γίνης K1,ποιός ο λόγος να γίνης Κ2;Ας το έβαζαν τουλάχιστον στίς 750 ώρες (3 φορές παραπάνω από τίς σημερινές 250) που σίγουρα αντιπροσωπεύουν περισσότερη εμπειρία,αλλά και πάλι είναι μιά λογική διαβάθμιση.Επίσης,άν "most first officers at major carriers already exceed that threshold" (δηλ.τών 1500 ωρών),κανείς απ'αυτούς δέν θα αφήση τον major carrier του (όπου έχει προοπτικές εξέλιξης σε K1 και αργότερα ενδεχομένως και σε management pilot,δηλαδή πιλότο με διοικητικά καθήκοντα όπως ΔΠΕ,chief pilot καί άλλα τοιαύτα σατανικά) γιά να πάη σ'έναν regional carrier πάλι σάν Κ2 και με λιγώτερες προοπτικές εξέλιξης.

ΥΓ.Ψιλοάσχετο,αλλά ο Κ1 τού αεροπλάνου που συνετρίβη στό Ισλαμαμάντ είχε 30.000 ώρες (δηλαδή σάν να είχε περάσει 3,5 ολόκληρα χρόνια απ΄την ζωή του συνεχώς στόν αέρα...).
 
Δεν καταλαβες καλα μου φενεται ...
οτι καλυτερο για την αγορα θα ειναι αυτο, ειδικα για τους πιλοτους στα regionals τις Αμερικης που αρχιζουν με 16,000-20,000 δολαρια το χρονο για να πετανε αεροπλανο με επιβατες. Τωρα με το 1500 δυσκολα θα βρισκουν (η εταιριες) ατομα με τοσο "experience" να θελουν να δουλεψουν για 20,000 δολαρια .. μπραβο δυστυχως επρεπε να χαθουν ζωες για να το παρουν χαμπαρι.
 
Συμπληρωματικές αλλαγές στους κανόνες εκπαίδευσης πιλότων, ι/φ και dispatchers των regional αεροπορικών
The Congressional mandate imposed last July reflected a significant shift in training methods, from one that seeks to avoid the stall the crew found themselves in, to a more robust training that teaches them how to deal with a stall or other unusual upsets once they do happen. The agency called this the most significant crew training update in 20 years.

Crew would have to demonstrate their ability to handle “real-world” emergencies, not just learn what to do. It mandates more realistic simulator training. In addition, crew would be required to train as a complete flight crew, coordinating their actions through Crew Resource Management, and fly scenarios based on actual events. The proposed rule also seeks to ensure the pilot in command and the second in command have equivalent levels of training. Dispatchers would have enhanced training and would be required to apply that knowledge in today’s complex operating environment.
...
The proposal also requires remedial training for pilots with performance deficiencies such as failing a proficiency test or check, or unsatisfactory performance during flight training or a simulator course. Thus, the agency was silent on one of the major problems found by the National Transportation Safety Board in the post-accident investigation. During hearings, the board emphasised the seven failures of the captain of the Q400 both in his early days learning to become a pilot and as a line pilot at a regional airline. Safety experts said this clearly indicated the need for a cap on such failures suggesting that there are some who just shouldn’t be allowed to fly commercially.

The proposal details how carriers can modify training programs for aircraft with similar flight handling characteristics. It also reorganises and revises the qualification, training, and evaluation requirements for all crew members and dispatchers.

As with the original proposal, the supplemental notice would require the use of pilot flight simulation training devices. Pilots also would have to complete special hazard training in addition to practicing the use of crew resource management skills.

:arrow: CAPA
 
Αν κατάλαβα καλά,μέχρι τώρα οι απαιτήσεις που έπρεπε να πληρούν όσοι πιλότοι πετούσαν σε regional εταιρείες στίς ΗΠΑ ήταν πιό χαλαρές από αυτές γιά τίς -ας πούμε- "μεγάλες" εταιρείες και συνεπώς οι εν λόγω πιλότοι μπορούσαν να έχουν κάπως "πλημμελή" εκπαίδευση,σωστά;Και τώρα αυτό που γίνεται είναι ότι και αυτοί πρέπει να πληρούν τίς ίδιες προδιαγραφές με τους λοιπούς.

Ωστόσο,έχω την εντύπωση ότι υπάρχουν στίς ΗΠΑ regional εταιρείες που χρησιμοποιούν ίδιους τύπους αεροπλάνων με τίς "μεγάλες" και συνεπώς τα πληρώματά τους και το εν γένει προσωπικό που διαχειρίζεται αυτά τα αεροπλάνα πρέπει λογικά να έχη τίς ίδιες προδιαγραφές.Ενα π.χ. 738 χρησιμοποιείται με τον ίδιο τρόπο είτε ανήκει στην Continental και κάνει διεθνή δρομολόγια είτε στην Grand Canyon Middle Central Airways και κάνει δρομολόγια μεταξύ επαρχιακών πόλεων στίς κεντρικές πολιτείες τών ΗΠΑ-δέν βλέπω τον λόγο γιατί να υπάρχουν διαφορετικοί κανονισμοί.

Αλλο βέβαια είναι μιά εταιρεία που έχει π.χ. καμμιά δεκαριά Beechcraft KIng Air-εκεί ήταν "λογικό" ότι μέχρι τώρα οι απαιτήσεις,προδιαγραφές κλπ ήταν πιό χαλαρές.Το κακό όμως είναι ότι όταν οι απαιτήσεις είναι χαλαρές,μπορούν να χαλαρώσουν κι'άλλο και να φτάση η εταιρεία στο επίπεδο τού χαβαλέ και τής προχειροδουλειάς χωρίς να το πάρη χαμπάρι κανείς-μέχρι να γίνη κάποια στραβή και να χαθούν ζωές,οπότε όλοι αρχίζουν και τρέχουν.....

@MIle High Club:κάπως καθυστερημένα το λέω,αλλά δέν καταλαβαίνω τί είναι αυτό που νομίζεις πως δέν κατάλαβα;Αν δέν απατώμαι,αυτό που λές και εσύ είπα:ότι άν κάποιος Κ2 σε μεγάλο carrier έχη μαζέψει 1500 ώρες,γιατί να αφήση τον μεγάλο αυτό carrier γιά να πάη σ'έναν μικρότερο-και να παίρνη και λιγώτερα λεφτά;Ενώ άν οι ελάχιστες ώρες ήταν 750,τότε όντως θα βρίσκανε πιό εύκολα άτομα,αφού οι ώρες θα ήταν λίγες μέν γιά να γίνης Κ2 σε μεγάλη εταιρεία,αρκετές όμως γιά να ξεκινήσης από μιά μικρότερη.
 
Hastaroth":3eamng52 said:
Ωστόσο,έχω την εντύπωση ότι υπάρχουν στίς ΗΠΑ regional εταιρείες που χρησιμοποιούν ίδιους τύπους αεροπλάνων με τίς "μεγάλες" και συνεπώς τα πληρώματά τους και το εν γένει προσωπικό που διαχειρίζεται αυτά τα αεροπλάνα πρέπει λογικά να έχη τίς ίδιες προδιαγραφές.Ενα π.χ. 738 χρησιμοποιείται με τον ίδιο τρόπο είτε ανήκει στην Continental και κάνει διεθνή δρομολόγια είτε στην Grand Canyon Middle Central Airways και κάνει δρομολόγια μεταξύ επαρχιακών πόλεων στίς κεντρικές πολιτείες τών ΗΠΑ-δέν βλέπω τον λόγο γιατί να υπάρχουν διαφορετικοί κανονισμοί.

Aπ' τα λίγα που έχω διαβάσει, οι legacy carriers δεν χρησιμοποιούν μικρά α/φη (Ε90/95 νομίζω ήταν τα μικρότερα που είχα βρεί). Αντιθετώς, για αυτές τις "βρωμοδουλειές" χρησιμοποιούνται άλλες αεροπορικές, μικρότερες, οι οποίες συνάπτουν συμφωνίες με τις μεγάλες και αναλαμβάνουν μεταφορικό έργο υπό το brand name της μαμάς-εργοδότριας (ένα καλό παράδειγμα ποικιλομορφίας η US Airways Express με 9 "μικρές"). Οι στολοι των μικρών αυτών αεροπορικών είναι το πολύ κατηγορίας CR9 κ E70/75 και ίσως να υπάρχει ως λόγος για αυτό το να επιτυγχάνεται διαχωρισμός.

Παραπάνω δεν γνωρίζω αλλά απ' ότι είδα στο φόρουμ έχουμε κόσμο που εργάζεται σε regional στις ΗΠΑ και θα μπορούσε ενδεχομένως να μας διαφωτίσει περισσότερο...
 
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